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A PROPOSAL TO USE A "KNOWING AND
VOLUNTARY" STANDARD TO EVALUATE
THE "VOLUNTARINESS" OF EARLY
RETIREMENT INCENTIVES
I. Introduction
XYZ Corporation (XYZ) is experiencing extreme financial diffi-
culties. Management responds to the crisis by offering early retirement
incentives' in order to reduce its work force. The offer includes an
immediate ten-thousand dollar severance payment and the company's
regular retirement benefits. To be eligible for the incentive, employees
must be age fifty-five or older, and have been employed by the
company for at least ten years. The offer is open for one month.
Management hopes that the incentive will induce a sufficient number
of employees to retire, thereby precluding layoffs.
Sam Goodworker is a fifty-five year old employee who has worked
for XYZ for the past thirty years. Sam accepts the early retirement
incentive fearing that if he fails to do so he may be laid off without
any benefits. After he retires, Sam brings an action against XYZ
based on the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),2
claiming that his retirement was involuntary.3 XYZ defends on the
ground that Sam's retirement was purely voluntary. Although this
hypothetical is representative of many lawsuits brought under ADEA,4
the criteria used in determining whether retirement is truly voluntary
1. An early retirement incentive refers to the practice of extending the option
of a financial incentive beyond normal pension benefits in exchange for early
retirement. See Most Firms Still Offering Incentives, New Conference Board Survey
Concludes, [Jan.-June] Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 152 (Jan. 28, 1985) (survey
entitled, Managing Older Workers: Company Policies and Attitudes) [hereinafter
Managing Older Workers].
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
3. It is illegal to force an employee age 40 or older to retire because of his
age. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1982).
4. See, e.g., Paolillo v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 821 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1987); Henn
v. National Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d 824 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
454 (1987); Sutton v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 646 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1981); Anderson
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 650 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
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remain unclear.' Moreover, the legislature has been silent on this
issue and the courts have been unilluminating.
This-Note argues that a standard is needed to judge the "vol-
untariness" of early retirement incentives. Part II of this Note
examines the need for clear guidelines to evaluate the voluntariness
of early retirement incentives in light of their increasing use in a
society that is growing older and retiring earlier. Part III discusses
the aims and prohibitions of ADEA, and the procedure by which
plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. Part
IV sets forth the cases that discuss early retirement incentives, and
then criticizes the courts for failing to offer clear guidelines for
judging whether early retirement is voluntary. Part V discusses the
similarites between early retirement incentives and releases, 6 and
proposes that the "knowing and voluntary" standard used to de-
termine the validity of releases serves as an appropriate model on
which to evaluate the voluntariness of early retirement incentives.
II. The Need for Standards to Evaluate the "Voluntariness" of
Early Retirement Incentives
Employers have had to adapt to a society that is growing older7
and retiring earlier.8 The use of early retirement incentives has been
5. See infra notes 103-19 and accompanying text.
6. "A release is a writing providing that a duty owed to the maker of the
release is discharged immediately. or on the occurrence of a condition." See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 284(1) (1979).
7. The United States population is becoming increasingly older. Census data
indicates that while the total American population is expected to increase by 33%
from 1982 to 2050, the growth rate of people age 55 and older will climb by
113%. By the year 2020 the oldest baby boomers will be 75 and the youngest 56.
The work force will reflect this trend. By the year 2010 nearly half of all employed
persons will be 40 and older. Older Americans in the Workforce: Challenges and
Solutions, 14 Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 28, at 925 (July 13, 1987) (report by the
Bureau of National Affairs Inc. (BNA)) [hereinafter Older Americans].
8. There is a strong trend toward early retirement across the country. One
explanation may be the culmination of employers' efforts to structure the work
force through the use of early retirement incentives. See Kass, Early Retirement
Incentives and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 4 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J.
63 (1986) [hereinafter Kass]. Statistics from a BNA report show that the proportion
of persons age 65 and older in the work force fell from 27% to 12% between
1950 and 1982. See Older Americans, supra note 7, at 925. A 1986 General
Accounting Office report concluded that the total number of people between 50
and 65 who were receiving pensions nearly doubled between 1973 and 1983. Id.
A survey based on 363 companies by The Conference Board Inc. found that most
firms encourage retirement before age 65, and that in most companies the average
retirement age is lower than it was 12 years ago. Managing Older Workers, supra
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a popular response. 9 An "early retirement incentive" or "open-
window offer" refers to the practice of extending the option of a
financial incentive beyond pension-related inducements in exchange
for early retirement.10 The offer is of limited duration and is directed
to a particular employee or group of workers who satisfy specified
minimum age or service requirements. 1 A typical early retirement
incentive may include supplementary payments, 2 retirement benefits
calculated as if the retiree ended his employment at some future
age, 3 and extra medical and life insurance coverage. 14
Early retirement incentives have proven to be useful to employers.
An employer may be motivated to extend these incentives for reasons
that include: (1) opening career paths for younger workers; 5 (2) avoiding
note 1, at 152. The survey further noted that in 51% of the companies, the average
retirement age was 62 or younger, up from 23% in 1972. Id. at 153; see SELECT
COMMITTEE ON AGING, 95TH CONG., IST SESS., MANDATORY RETIREMENT: THE SOCIAL
AND HUMAN COST OF ENFORCED IDLENESS 9 (Comm. Print 1977) ("there is clearly
a strong trend toward early retirement").
9. A 1986 BNA survey reported the interviews of 114 members of the Bureau's
1983-1984 Personnel Policies Forum. This group consisted of 42% manufacturing
companies, 27% nonmanufacturing firms and 3107o nonbusiness establishments such
as health care organizations, educational institutions and government agencies. When
measured by the size of the work force, 52% of the group were classified as small
(fewer than 1,000 employees) and 48% were labeled as large (1,000 or more
employees). The study concluded that approximately one-fifth of the companies
had offered early retirement incentives in the five years prior to the Survey. A
higher percentage of large firms offered open-window plans than small firms by
a margin of 27% to 1107o. Majority of Employers Let Older Workers Stay on
Jobs Past Age 70, BNA Survey Says, [Jan.-June] Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at
956-57 (May 19, 1986) (survey entitled, EEOC Policies and Programs). A similar
result was found in a study sponsored by Hewitt Associates which reported that
out of 529 companies, 121 had offered an early retirement incentive. Firms Use
Early Retirement Windows, Bonuses to Cut Workforce, Hewitt Finds, [Jan.-June]
Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 395 (Mar. 3, 1986) (survey entitled, Plan Design and
Experience in Early Retirement Windows and Other Voluntary Separation Plans).
A survey of the Fortune 50 Industrials by the Wyatt Company's Research and
Information Center showed that 16 out of 50 of the largest industrial companies
offered early retirement incentives in 1986, compared to only 6 companies in 1985.
In the past 10 years, 30 out of the 50 companies have extended open-window
offers. Top 50: A Survey of Retirement, Thrift and Profit-Sharing Plans Covering
Salaried Employees of 50 Large U.S. Industrial Companies as of Jan. 1, 1987, 14
Pens. Rep. (BNA).No. 28, at 926 (July 13, 1987).
10. See Managing Older Workers, supra note 1, at 153.
11. Id.
12. See Henn v. National Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d 824, 826 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 454 (1987).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Employers Rate Plans Successful in Meeting Objectives, Survey Finds, [Jan;-
June] Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 277 (Feb. 10, 1986) (survey conducted by Towers,
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layoffs 6 or forestalling layoffs of younger workers;17 (3) saving
additional costs associated with older, generally higher paid em-
ployees;" s (4) lowering costs 19 and achieving enhanced efficiency; 20
(5) reducing a long-term work-force imbalance;2' (6) offsetting costs
when defending against takeover bids; 22 and (7) eliminating staff
redundancy arising from a merger, acquisition or a change in business
direction. 23 A recent survey24 indicates that most employers consider
early retirement incentives successful in meeting management objec-
tives .25
Early retirement incentives are becoming more common. 26 Au-
thorities suggest that the use of such incentives will continue to
increase particularly as society grows older and workers retire earlier. 27
In order to guard against involuntary early retirement, standards
Perrin, Forster & Crosby of 100 large companies that have offered at least one
early retirement incentive during Jan. 1983 to Dec. 1985) [hereinafter Towers Survey];
see EEOC v. Home Ins. Co., 672 F.2d 252, 261-62 (2d Cir. 1982); Anderson v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 650 F. Supp. 1480, 1482 (N.D. I11. 1987); 1 H. EGLIT,
AGE DISCRIMINATION § 16.39B, at ls-194 (Supp. 1987) [hereinafter EGLIT].
16. See Towers Survey, supra note 15, at 277.
17. See EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 632 F. Supp. 343, 369 (E.D. Pa.
1986).
18. See Cipriano v. Board of Education, 785 F.2d 51, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1986);
Coburn v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 339, 344 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983); 1 EGLIT, supra note 15, § 16.39B, at 1s-194.
19. See Towers Survey, supra note 15, at 277.
20. See Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66 (6th Cir. 1982);
1 EGLIT, supra note 15, § 16.39B, at 1s-194.
21. Retirement, Severance Pay Incentives to be Offered to Hewlett-Packard
Employees, [Jan.-June] Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 1146-47 (June 23, 1986). In
1986, Hewlett-Packard announced that it would be offering early retirement to
1,800 long-service employees and voluntary incentives to an unspecified number of
employees in order to reduce a long-term work-force imbalance. A company spokes-
woman noted that traditionally, temporary imbalances were addressed through
transfers or retraining. Manufacturing innovations, however, have reduced the
number of employees required in certain areas. The early retirement incentives are
designed to eliminate an imbalance caused by people with obsolete skills.
22. AT&T, CBS Offer Plans to Reduce Size of Workforce, Offset Takeover
Fight Costs, [July-Dec.] Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1231 (Sept. 9, 1985). In
1985, CBS offered early retirement incentives to 2,000 out of 30,000 employees to
help offset the cost of its successful effort to block the takeover bid of Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. Id.
23. See Towers Survey, supra note 15, at 277.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See 1 EGLIT, supra note 15, § 16.39B, at 1s-194 ("[ilt has become increasingly
common for employers to offer incentives to employees to retire early"); supra
note 9 and accompanying text.
27. See 2 EGLIT, supra note 15, § 16.18A, at 16-42.2; supra notes 7-9 and
accompanying text.
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should be developed to evaluate the "voluntariness" of early re-
tirement incentives.
HI. Proving an ADEA Claim
A. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA or the Act)2
addresses the problem of age discrimination in the workplace. In
enacting ADEA, Congress responded to a 1965 report by the Sec-
retary of Labor29 which found that discrimination against older people
in the workplace was a significant problem that needed immediate
federal legislation.30
Congress believed that ADEA would correct both societal and
individual effects of unemployment among older workers.3 ' On a
societal level, Congress was concerned with the loss of services that
older people contribute to the work force,32 and the increasing public
28. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
29. See THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT:
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF
THE CrvIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3 (1965) [hereinafter THE OLDER AMERICAN
WORKER]. During consideration of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a
to 2000h-6, Congress directed the Secretary of Labor to conduct a study to examine
age discrimination in employment and to submit legislative recommendations. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 265 (superseded by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 10, 86 Stat.
111).
.30. See THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, supra note 29, at 3. President Johnson
strongly supported enacting ADEA. In his Older American message of Jan. 23,
1967, recommending ADEA, the President stated that "[h]undreds of thousands,
not yet old, not yet voluntarily retired, find themselves jobless because of arbitrary
age discrimination." President's Message to Congress on Older Americans, H.R.
REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2213, 2214 (Jan. 23, 1967) [hereinafter President's Message].
31. See Note, Waiver of Rights Under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1067, 1068 (1986).
32. In a 1977 report stressing the harm of early retirement on the economy,
the Select Committee on Aging commented that "[e]ach year as thousands of people
are encouraged or forced to retire, their skills, knowledge and wisdom are lost
and their opportunities to instruct, teach, consult or advise, listen and reflect, as
well as to work, are cut off." See SELECT COMMITTEE ON AGING, 95TH CONG., IST
SESS., MANDATORY RETIREMENT: THE SOCIAL AND HUMAN COST OF ENFORCED IDLE-
NESS 23 (Comm. Print 1977) (quoting R. BUTLER, WHY SURVIVE? BEING OLD IN
AMERICA 65 (1975)) [hereinafter MANDATORY RETIREMENT]. Senator Javits, a primary
supporter and framer of ADEA, stated that the main objective of the statute was
to stop "the danger of [a] tragic waste of one of our most precious resources-
the talent and experience accumulated by our older workers over the course of
decades." S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1967) (individual views of
Sen. Javits).
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cost of supporting the retired.33 From an individual perspective,
Congress felt compelled by the emotional and financial hardship
that may result from forced retirement.14
The objective of ADEA, as set forth in the Act, is: "(1)'to
promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather
than age; (2) to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment;
[and] (3) to help employers and workers find ways of meeting
problems arising from the impact of age on employment." 35 ADEA
extends coverage to individuals age forty or older, 36 and prohibits
employers3 7 from discriminating on the basis of age while engaged
33. The Select Committee on Aging warned that if unemployment of older
persons continued, "we will not be able to afford, culturally, psychologically, or
financially, to continue supporting large dependent populations without serious
social changes." See MANDATORY RETIREMENT, supra note 32, at 23.
34. See 113 CONG. REC. 34,744 (1967) (statement of Rep. Kelly) (premature
retirement among older workers imposes a "cruel sacrifice in happiness and well-
being") (quoting President's Message, supra note 30).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982) (congressional statement of findings and purpose)
(numbers added).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1982). As first enacted, ADEA only protected persons
between the ages of 40 and 65. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 12, 81 Stat. 602, 607 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 631(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). In 1978, the upper age limit was raised to age
70 for employees in the private sector. Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 189, 189 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). In 1986, the age cap
was removed for private sector employees. Age Discrimination in Employment
Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 2(c), 100 Stat. 3342, 3342 (to be
codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)). ADEA contains a number of exceptions to its
nondiscrimination provisions. For instance, employers can involuntarily retire any
employee who for two years prior to retirement, is employed in a bona fide
executive or high policymaking position, and is entitled to an immediate nonfor-
feitable annual retirement benefit of at least $44,000. 29.U.S.C. § 631(c)(1) (Supp.
IV 1986). ADEA also permits the forced retirement of tenured college faculty at
age 70. 29 U.S.C. § 631(d) (1982). The statute also recognizes the rights of states,
political subdivisions of states, and their agencies, instrumentalities or interstate
agencies to retire firefighters or law enforcement officials who have reached re-
tirement age under state or local law. Age Discrimination in Employment Amend-
ments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 3(a)(i)(1), 100 Stat. 3342, 3342 (1986)
(amending 29 U.S.C. § 623). ADEA also recognizes an affirmative defense that
allows employers to discharge an individual based upon age "where age is a bona
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (Supp. IV 1986). Notwithstanding the
changes in ADEA, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) defines
normal retirement as age 65. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982).
37. ADEA defines employer as any "person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has [20] or more employees for each working day in each of [20]
or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." 29 U.S.C.
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in a spectrum of actions and decisions, including: "(1) hiring; (2)
discharges; (3) decisions regarding compensation, terms, conditions
and privileges of employment; (4) job classifications; (5) job referrals;
and (6) exclusion from union membership. 38
Mandatory retirement is specifically forbidden by a 1978 amend-
ment to section 4(f)(2) of ADEA. 39 This section as originally enacted
allowed an exception to the Act's general prohibition against age
discrimination by making it lawful "to observe the terms of ...
any bona fide employee benefit plan . . . which is not a subterfuge
to evade the purposes of this Act." 4 The Supreme Court interpreted
this exception as permitting mandatory retirement under the terms
of a pension plan.4 ' Congress thereafter amended this section by
adding that no "employee benefit plan shall require or permit the
involuntary retirement" of protected individuals.4 2 The purpose be-
hind section 4(f)(2) is to encourage the hiring of older workers by
not requiring employers to give older workers the same benefits as
their younger counterparts. 4
3
B. The McDonnell Douglas Test
A complainant may prove an ADEA claim either through direct
or circumstantial evidence. 44 When proving age discrimination cir-
§ 630(b) (1982). The term "employer" also includes any agent of such person, in
addition to states, political subdivisions of states, their agencies and instrumentalities,
and all interstate agencies. Id.
38. 2 EGLIT, supra note 15, § 16.01, at 16-5 (1987) (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a)-(c) (1982)) (numbers added).
39. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2(a), 92
Stat. 189, 189 (1978) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1982)).
40. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 4(f)(2), 81
Stat. 602, 603 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1982)).
41. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977) (holding that
retirement pursuant to a bona fide plan is valid if adopted before the passage of
ADEA); see also id. at 207-08 (White, J., concurring) (holding that "[ADEA] does
not prohibit involuntary retirements pursuant to bona fide plans"); Zinger v.
Blanchette, 549 F.2d 901, 910 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding that involuntary retirement
is valid if it is pursuant to a bona fide plan that is not a subterfuge to evade the
purposes of ADEA), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978); Brennan v. Taft Broad-
casting Co., 500 F.2d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 1974) (court concluded that a plan could
not be a subterfuge within the meaning of § 4(0(2) if it was operative before the
effective date of ADEA).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1982).
43. See S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 504, 512.
44. See Kier v. Commercial Union Ins. Cos., 808 F.2d 1254, 1257 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1955 (1987); Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458,
462 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 954 (1987).
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cumstantially, the order and allocation of proof is governed by the
test set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.45 In McDonnell
Douglas, the plaintiff alleged racial discrimination because of the
defendant's refusal to hire him,46 in violation of title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).47 In addressing the critical issue
of proof, the Court designed a prima facie test based on the as-
sumption that if certain acts are otherwise unexplained, there is a
strong presumption that the action complained of is based on con-
sideration of impermissible factors. 48 In order to establish a prima
facie case, the Court held that the plaintiff has the burden of showing
that: (1) he belongs to a racial minority; (2) he applied and was
qualified for an available position; (3) he was rejected despite his
qualifications; and (4) after his rejection, the position remained
available, and the employer continued to seek applicants with the
complainant's qualifications. 49 Once the plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to articulate
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's discharge. 0
If the employer meets this burden, the plaintiff must show that the
employer's articulated reason is a mere pretext for discrimination."
At all times, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving that
race was a determining factor in the employer's decision.12
The McDonnell Douglas formula is a flexible rule" that is applied
by virtually all of the circuits when resolving ADEA claims.14 In
45. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
46. Id. at 796.
47. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a), 78 Stat. 265 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982)) (Title VII). For a discussion of the similarities
between ADEA and Title VII, see infra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
48. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
49. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 804.
52. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
53. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 n.6; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802
n.13 ("facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification above
of the prima facie proof required from [plaintiff] is not necessarily applicable in
every respect to differing factual situations").
54. See Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1982); Halsell
v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 683 F.2d 285 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1205
(1983); Anderson v. Savage Laboratories, Inc., 675 F.2d 1221 (11th Cir. 1982);
Johnson v. Lehman, 679 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Goodman v. Heublein, Inc.,
645 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1981); Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1981);
Smithers v. Bailar, 629 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1980); Kephart v. Institute of Gas
Technology, 630 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981); Loeb
v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979); Schwager v. Sun Oil Co., 591
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employee discharge cases, the test has been modified because it was
formulated in conjunction with an action for refusal to hire. In
applying the modified test, the plaintiff must show that he: (1) was
within the protected age group;55 (2) was qualified to do the job;
and (3) was discharged. 6
Modification of the fourth part of the McDonnell Douglas test
to fit employee discharge cases has generated considerable variation
and confusion, with the courts emphasizing many different require-
ments. One line of cases requires that the discharged employee be
replaced.17 Within this category the majority insist that the replace-
ment be younger than the plaintiff. 8 Some courts demand that the
complainant be replaced by someone outside the protected age group. 9
Still other courts merely require that the discharged employee be
replaced, regardless of the replacement's age. 60
Another line of cases reveals that if the plaintiff is unable to
establish that he was replaced, the court will permit the plaintiff to
demonstrate that his position remained open while his employer
continued to search for employees with similar qualifications. 6 A
few courts find it sufficient to show that the complainant was
terminated while younger employees possessing similar skills and
doing like work were retained. 62
In large scale reduction in work-force cases, 6 most courts eliminate
the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test. 64 The rationale is
F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1979); Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730
(5th Cir. 1977). But see Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66, 70
(6th Cir. 1982) (refusing to apply McDonnell Douglas to ADEA claims auto-
matically).
55. The protected age group includes individuals 40 and older. See supra note
36 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Kier v. Commercial Union Ins. Cos., 808 F.2d 1254, 1257 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1955 (1987); Coburn v. Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc., 711 F.2d 339, 342 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983); McCorstin
v. United States Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749, 752 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 627 F.2d
239 (1980); Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014; Schwager, 591 F.2d at 61.
57. See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., Coburn, 711 F.2d at 342; Schwager, 591 F.2d at 61.
59. See, e.g., McCorstin, 621 F.2d at 752.
60. See, e.g., Kier, 808 F.2d at 1257; Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1014.
61. See, e.g., Kephart, 630 F.2d at 1222; Cova v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 574
F.2d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1978).
62. See, e.g., Pirone v. Home Ins. Co., 559 F. Supp. 306, 309-10 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 742 F.2d 1430 (2d Cir. 1983); Kahn v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Group, 547 F.
Supp. 736, 739 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
63. A reduction in work force is when an employer terminates employees in
order to reduce his staff, and does not replace the discharged workers. See Smith
v. Farah Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 64, 67 (5th Cir. 1981).
64. See generally 2 EGLIT, supra note 15, § 17.61, at 17-196 to -198 (1987).
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simply that in this context the number of jobs are drastically reduced
and employees are generally not replaced. 65
C. Constructive Discharge
The third prong of the modified McDonnell Douglas test requires
that the employee be discharged. 66 While this point is generally not
disputed, proving discharge becomes problematic in cases alleging
involuntary retirement. The plaintiff is not actually discharged but
claims that he is being coerced into early retirement. In such cases,
proving constructive discharge rather than actual discharge is an
acceptable way to establish the discharge element in the plaintiff's
prima facie case. 67
Traditionally, constructive discharge has been found to exist when
an employer deliberately makes an employee's working conditions
so intolerable that a "reasonable person ' 6 would feel compelled to
resign.6 9 Unlike a typical constructive discharge case, the claim in
an involuntary retirement action is not that the employer imposed
intolerable working conditions, but rather that the employer offered
an early retirement incentive in an unreasonable and coercive manner.
A more recent and appropriate definition of constructive discharge
in this context is that a reasonable person in the employee's position
would feel compelled to accept the early retirement incentive.70 Proof
that an early retirement incentive is involuntarily accepted is sufficient
to establish constructive discharge. 71
65. Id.
66. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Guthrie v. J.C. Penney Co., 803 F.2d 202, 206-07 (5th Cir. 1986);
Williams v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 770 F.2d 47, 49 (6th Cir. 1985); Bristow v.
Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1254-55 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1082 (1986).
68. "Reasonable person" is an objective standard uniformly recognized by all
circuits. Bristow, 770 F.2d at 1255. The test is "whether a 'reasonable person' in
the employee's position would have felt compelled to resign." Id.
69. Guthrie, 803 F.2d at 207; Calhoun v. Acme Cleveland Corp., 798 F.2d
559, 561 (1st Cir. 1986); Williams, 770 F.2d at 49; Bristow, 770 F.2d at 1255;
Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1983); Johnson v. Bunny
Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981).
70. See Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 650 F. Supp. 1480, 1484 (N.D.
Ill. 1987); Amicus Curiae Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
at 17, Paolillo v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 821 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1987) [hereinafter
EEOC Amicus Curiae Brief].
71. See Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66 (6th Cir. 1982)
(plaintiff was unable to establish constructive discharge because employee's decision
to retire early was voluntary); Toussaint v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F.2d 812 (10th
Cir. 1978) (same); see also Allen v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 539 F. Supp. 57, 62
n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); 2 EGLIT, supra note 15, § 17.59, at 17-192 (1987).
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IV. The Problem of Evaluating "Voluntariness" in Early
Retirement Incentives
A. Cases Involving Early Retirement Incentives: Paolillo and
Henn
Despite the increasing use of early retirement incentives," the
standards for evaluating whether retirement is voluntary remain un-
clear.73 ADEA and its legislative history are silent on this issue.14
While many courts recognize the validity of such incentives7 5 they
fail to offer concise guidelines for resolving the question of vol-
untariness .76
Recently, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)77
suggested a number of factors that it believes to be significant in
determining whether an open-window plan is being coercively ad-
ministered. These factors require the employer to:
72. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
73. See generally 2 EGLIT, supra note 15, § 16.18B, at 16-42.4 to -42.7 (1987);
Freund & Prager, Is an Early Retirement Incentive a Benefit-Or a 'Gilded Shove'?,
Nat'l L.J., Sept. 14, 1987, at 28, col. 3.
74. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
75. See, e.g., Henn v. National Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d 824, 828 (7th Cir.)
("an offer of incentives to retire early is a benefit to the recipient, not a sign of
discrimination"), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 454 (1987); Coburn v. Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc., 711 F.2d 339, 344 (D.C. Cir.) ("[elarly retirement is a common
corporate practice utilized to prevent individual hardship. It is a humane practice
well accepted by both employers and employees, and is purely voluntary"), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983); Ackerman, 670 F.2d at 71 (early retirement gives an
employee an "opportunity to retire with dignity"); McCorstin v. United States
Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749, 755 (5th Cir.) ("early retirement is a laudable attempt
to provide security for those unable or disinclined to continue to work to the
mandatory or normal time for retirement"), reh'g denied, 627 F.2d 239 (1980).
But see Kass, supra note 8, at 63 (arguing that early retirement incentives should
be prohibited by ADEA because they foster ageist stereotypes and harm society
as a whole).
76: See infra notes 103-19 and accompanying text.
77. As originally enacted, ADEA designated the Department of Labor as the
agency responsible for the Act's administration and enforcement. Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, §§ 6-7, 81 Stat. 602, 604 (1969) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 625-626 (1982)). In 1978, President Carter issued an
order transferring the administrative and enforcement authority of ADEA to the
EEOC as of July 1, 1979. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 92 Stat. 3781, 3781,
43 Fed. Reg. 19,807 (May 9, 1979). The transfer was firmly established by specific
legislation authorizing EEOC enforcement of ADEA. Ratification of Reorganization
Plans as a Matter of Law, Pub. L. No. 98-532, 98 Stat. 2705, 2705 (1984) (codified
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 901-912 (1982)). The EEOC has affirmitively established that voluntary
early retirement is lawful. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.9(0 (1986).
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(1) provide accurate information about the plan and related ben-
efits;
(2) provide honest information about job prospects with the com-
pany to the best of its knowledge;
(3) allow sufficient time for the employee to make a considered
decision; and
(4) assure employees that they are free to decline the offer.7 1
Two recent appellate court rulings involving claims of mandatory
retirement focus on a number of these factors. In Paolillo v. Dresser
Industries, Inc. 79 the defendant-employer's Whitney Chain Division
(Whitney Chain) offered open-window plans to all of its employees
age sixty and older.80 Three employees who accepted the early re-.
tirement package subsequently brought an ADEA action against the
company, claiming that they were forced to retire because they were
given insufficient time to consider the offer.8' Two of the plaintiffs
had six days from the date the option was announced to decide
whether to accept or reject the offer,8 2 while the third employee had
only five days to decide.83
In assessing whether the plaintiffs' retirement was voluntary, the
appellate court focused its attention on the issue of time. The court
ruled that "employees must be given a reasonable amount of time
to reflect and to weigh their options in order to make a considered
choice. The amount of time reasonably required . . . will vary de-
pending on the circumstances of each case." 8
The appellate court concluded that the district court had erred in
holding that, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs had voluntarily
accepted the plan. 5 In reaching this decision the appellate court
considered that "the shortness of time given to [the plaintiffs] to
make a decision, the reason for the compressed time period, 86 the
length of service of [the plaintiffs] with Whitney Chain 7 and the
apparent complexity of the options open to them certainly raise[d]
78. See EEOC Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 70, at 20.
79. 821 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1987).
80. Id. at 83.
81. Id. at 84.
82. Id. at 83.
83. Id.
84. Paolillo v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 821 F.2d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 1987).
85. Id.
86. The defendant wanted time to assess the effect of the early retirement plan
before the end of its fiscal year. Id.
87. At the time of the open-window offer, the three plaintiffs had been employed
by the defendant for 31 years, 16 years and 15 years. Id.
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a material issue as to whether [the plaintiffs] were given sufficient
time to make a considered choice." '8 8 The court also noted that the
plaintiffs' signed acknowledgment that their acceptance was voluntary
did not establish that they had retired freely.8 9
In Henn v. National Geographic Society,9° the defendant-employer
offered all of its advertising salesmen over the age of fifty-five the
option of early retirement. 91 The offer was open for over two
months.9 2 Twelve of the fifteen recipients accepted the offer.93 Four
of the twelve filed an ADEA suit against the company, claiming
that their retirement was involuntary and resulted from undue pres-
sure.94 The court record indicates that the employees were under
pressure to sell and were confronted with threats of unpleasant
consequences if they did not increase their sales. 9 The court, however,
opined that selling is a risky business with attendant pressures to
produce.96 The court found that while the offer may have presented
the employees with a difficult choice, the facts did not merit a
finding of constructive discharge in violation of ADEA.97
Although the plaintiffs were found to have voluntarily retired, the
court did provide some guidance on the criteria to be considered
when addressing the question of voluntariness. Such factors include
whether "the person receive[d] information about what would happen
in response to the choice, [and whether] the person [had] an op-
portunity to say no." 98 Unlike the court in Paolillo, the Henn court
did not stress the importance of time when addressing the issue of
voluntariness. 99 The court noted, however, that a "very short period
to make a complex choice may show that the person could not
digest the information necessary to the decision."' ° The court con-
cluded that "[t]his would show that the offer of information was
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 819 F.2d 824 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 454 (1987).
91. Id. at 826.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 829-30.
96. Henn v. National Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d 824, 830 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 454 (1987).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 828.
99. Id. The court noted that "the need to make a decision in a short time,
under pressure, is an unusual definition of 'involuntary.' " Id.
100. Id. at 828-29.
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illusory and there was no informed choice."''1 The court suggested
that giving the employee time to consult with his spouse and financial
advisor should be sufficient. 0 2
B. A Critical Examination of Paolillo and Henn
Neither the EEOC nor the cases offer clear criteria to evaluate
whether a decision to retire pursuant to an early retirement incentive
is truly voluntary.103 The EEOC's guidelines are very general and
the decisions in both Paolillo and Henn are tailored to the particular
circumstances of each case, not lending themselves as a standard
on which to decide other cases.' °4 Nevertheless, the suggestions by
the EEOC and the cases read together indicate that there are three
main factors to weigh when assessing an early retirement incentive:
(1) time;'05 (2) adequate disclosure of information;' °6 and (3) the
opportunity to decline the offer. 10 7
1. What is Sufficient Time?
The Paolillo court based its decision on a finding that the plaintiffs
had insufficient time to make a considered choice, yet the court
failed to indicate what would have been an appropriate amount of
time. 108 The Henn court, on the other hand, made it clear that
brevity of time does not render a decision involuntary. 0 9 The Henn
court acknowledged, however, that a very short period of time to
decide may result in an illusory choice if the employee is unable to
assess the information." 0 Thus, precise guidelines of an acceptable
time-frame cannot be drawn from the cases.
101. Id. at 829.
102. Id.
103. See infra notes 104-19 and accompanying text.
104. For a discussion of the EEOC's guidelines, see supra note 78 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of Paolillo and Henn, see supra notes 79-102 and
accompanying text.
105. For a discussion of the time factor, see supra notes 78, 84-88, 99-102 and
accompanying text.
106. For a discussion of adequate disclosure, see supra notes 78, 98-101 and
accompanying text.
107. For a discussion of the ability of an employee to refuse an early retirement
incentive, see supra notes 78, 98 and accompanying text.
108. See Paolillo v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 821 F.2d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 1987).
109. See Henn v. National Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d 824, 828 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 454 (1987).
110. Id. at 828-29; see also Bodnar v. Synpol, Inc., 843 F.2d 190 (5th Cir.
1988). In Bodnar, the court found that the 15 days given to employees to decide
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2. Adequate Information
Recognizing that an open-window plan requires a major decision
by employees, the EEOC and the Henn court suggest that an em-
ployer has an obligation to provide employees with accurate infor-
mation about the plan and related benefits."' Nevertheless, neither
authority explains how an employer should channel this information
to his employees."12 Perhaps furnishing literature and a general ex-
planation about the plan would be sufficient." 3 As an added safe-
guard, an employer could provide preretirement counseling to assist
employees in understanding what can often be a complex plan." 4
Adequate disclosure becomes even more problematic regarding an
employer's duty to assess honestly an employee's future job prospects
with the company. It is difficult to imagine how an employer can
remain objective in advising the individual he has targeted for dis-
missal." '5 Furthermore, since the employee's status depends upon the
company's success, the employer is left in a difficult position. The
employer must give the employee an accurate assessment of the
company's future, but it is unclear just how much the employer is
required to divulge. Moreover, the disclosure of private financial
records and future business plans could damage the company.
3. Ability to Decline the Offer
Evidence that some people in the group who are eligible to retire
declinethe offer may tend to show that the plan is not coercive. 1 6
While this may be probative on the issue of voluntariness, the test
remains whether a reasonable person, and not an eligible employee,
would feel compelled to retire." 7 Moreover, in a large scale reduction
in work-force case, an employee's freedom of choice is seriously
whether to accept or reject an early retirement offer did not render their decision
involuntary. The court cautioned that it would closely scrutinize any plan that was
offered on a shorter schedule, but noted that a struggling business must often
pursue a quick and decisive course of action in order to stem losses. Id. at 193-
94.
111. See supra notes 78, 98-101 and accompanying text.
112. See Henn v. National Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1988);
EEOC Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 70.
113. See, e.g., Paolillo, 821 F.2d at 83.
114. In a survey of 100 businesses that offered early retirement incentives, 75o
of the employers provided preretirement counseling to eligible employees. See Towers
Survey, supra note 15, at 277.
115. See Kass, supra note 8, at 80-81.
116. Id. at 82-83; see id. at 80-81.
117. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
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hampered when the alternative is most probably a layoff or dis-
charge." 8 In this context, the employee may perceive the offer not
as a choice, but rather as mandatory."19
V. A Proposal for Application of the "Knowing and
Voluntary" Standard Taken From Release Cases
A. Analogy Between Releases and Early Retirement Incentives
A common device used by employers to settle disputes and avert
potential controversies is to obtain from employees a release of their
right to bring an ADEA claim. 20 In order for a release to be valid,
it must be entered into "knowingly and voluntarily.''2 This "know-
ing and voluntary" standard used in release cases serves as an
appropriate model on which to evaluate the voluntariness of early
retirement incentives. 22
The adoption of a "knowing and voluntary" standard to early
retirement offers is justified because of the similarities between
releases and early retirement incentives. Both releases and early
retirement incentives share a common definition. In a release, the
right to bring an ADEA claim is waived for valuable consideration.' 23
118. See Kass, supra note 8, at 81.
119. See id. Some courts have indicated that an early retirement incentive may
be involuntary if the plan is presented as a take-it-or-leave-it proposal. See Bodnar
v. Synpol, Inc., 843 F.2d 190, 193-94 (5th Cir. 1988); Henn, 819 F.2d at 828;
Herbert v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 47 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 152, 157 (Mass.
Dist. Ct. 1988).
120. Silberman & Bolick, The EEOC's Proposed Rule on Releases of Claims
Under the ADEA, 37 LAB. L.J. 195 (1986) [hereinafter Silberman & Bolick].
121. See Valenti v. International Mill Serv., Inc., 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1054, 1057 (3d Cir. 1987) (subsequent appeal dismissed after parties settled,
see Coventry v. United States Steel Corp., Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 169, at
D-3 n.4 (Aug. 31, 1988)); EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., L'oreal Hair Care Div., 821
F.2d 1085, 1091 (5th Cir. 1987); Lancaster v. Buerkle Buick Honda, 809 F.2d 539,
541 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3212 (1987); Cirillo v. Arco Chem. Co.,
No. 87-4026 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file); Anderson
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 650 F. Supp. 1480, 1486 (N.D. Ill. 1987); EEOC v.
United States Steel Corp., 583 F. Supp. 1357, 1361 (W.D. Pa. 1984); Roper v.
GTE Communication Systems Corp., No. 84 C 10898 (N.D. I11. Aug. 8, 1986)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file); DiMartino v. City of Hartford, 636 F. Supp.
1241, 1248 (D. Conn. 1986); Sullivan v. Boron Oil Co., Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 202, at D-1 (Oct. 21, 1987); see also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36, 52 (1974) (supporting in dicta the proposition that an employee can waive
a claim under Title VII if his consent is knowing and voluntary).
122. See infra notes 123-57 and accompanying text.
123. See Silberman & Bolick, supra note 120, at 195.
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Likewise, early retirement incentives require an employee to forgo
his livelihood before obtaining any benefits. 2 4 In addition, the pro-
priety of releases and early retirement incentives hinges on their
voluntary nature. Releases must be knowing and voluntary, 125 and
early retirement incentives can only be knowingly and voluntarily
accepted. 126
Finally, ADEA and ADEA release cases have a close connection
to title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). 17 ADEA
and Title VII share the same aim of eliminating discrimination from
the workplace. 28 The prohibitions of ADEA were even derived in
haec verba from Title VII.129 Given the similar purposes and sub-
stantive rights between both statutes, it is not unusual for the courts
to draw from Title VII case law when resolving a problem under
ADEA 13 0 For example, the standard for waiving ADEA claims is
taken from Title VII release cases.' In light of the similarities
between releases and early retirement incentives, it would be ap-
propriate for the legislature or courts to borrow the "knowing and
voluntary" standard found in release cases and extend it to the
analogous situation of early retirement incentives.
124. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
127. See infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
128. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979); Lorillard v.
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978).-
129. See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 584. In Lorillard, the Court stated the following:
Title VII with respect to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,
and the ADEA with respect-to age make it unlawful for an employer
'to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,' or otherwise
to 'discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,' on any of those bases.
Id. at 584 n.12 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982) and 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)
(1982)).
130. See 2 EGLIT, supra note 15, § 16.02, at 16-12 to -13.
131. See DiMartino v. City of Hartford, 636 F. Supp. 1241, 1245-48 (D. Conn.
1986); EEOC Notice of Final Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 32,293, 32,294 (Aug. 27, 1987)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1627(c)(1)-(3)) [hereinafter EEOC Notice of Final
Rule]. This EEOC regulation which authorizes unsupervised waivers under ADEA
has been suspended by Congress by an amendment to the Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1987. The amendment provides that the rule regarding unsupervised waivers
shall not have effect during fiscal year 1988, and that no funds may be expended
by the Commission to effectuate this regulation. Continuing Appropriations, Fiscal
Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329 (1987); see also Silberman &
Bolick, supra note 120, at 198.
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B. The "Knowing and Voluntary" Standard
1. An Explanation of the "Knowing and Voluntary" Standard
a. Knowing
The "knowing" component has been defined as a "meeting of
the minds"' 32-the releasor must genuinely intend to waive his claims.133
Applying this element to the context of an early retirement incentive,
an employee must also truly intend to retire.'- 4 Factors that are used
to determine if a release is "knowing" include: (1) an agreement
in writing that is clear and unambiguous; 35 (2) whether an employee
consults or is encouraged to meet with an attorney; 3 6 (3) whether
the* employee participates in negotiations concerning the terms and
conditions of the release;'3 7 (4) whether the employer explains and
the employee understands the language and consequences of the
release;' (5) the employment position, 3 9 business experience' 40 and
132. Silberman & Bolick, supra note 120, at 201.
133. Id.
134. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
135. See Sullivan v. Boron Oil Co., Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 202, at D-1
(Oct. 21, 1987); Lancaster v. Buerkle Buick Honda, 809 F.2d 539, 541 (8th'Cir.),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3212 (1987); Cirillo v. Arco Chem. Co., No. 87-4026 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 10, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file); Anderson v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 650 F. Supp. 1480, 1486 (N.D. I11. 1986); Roper v. GTE Com-
munications Systems Corp., No. 84 C 10898 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 1986) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Courts file); DiMartino v. City of Hartford, 636 F. Supp. 1241,
1248 (D. Conn. 1986); Oglesby v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 620 F. Supp. 1336,
1341-43 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Bernstein v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 622 F. Supp.
1096, 1105-06 (N.D. I11. 1984); EEOC v. United States Steel Corp., 583 F. Supp.
1357, 1360 (W.D. Pa. 1984); Silberman & Bolick, supra note 120, at 202; EEOC
Notice of Final Rule, supra note 131, at 32,294.
136. See Sullivan, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 202, at D-1; Cirillo, No. 87-4026
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file); DiMartino, 636 F. Supp. at 1248; Oglesby,
620 F. Supp. at 1343; United States Steel Corp., 583 F. Supp. at 1360; Silberman
& Bolick, supra note 120, at 202; EEOC Notice of Final Rule, supra note 131,
at 32,294.
137. See Valenti v. International Mill Serv., Inc., 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) at 1054, 1057 (3d Cir. 1987); Sullivan, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 202,
at D-1; Lancaster, 809 F.2d at 541; Cirillo, No. 87-4026 (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Courts file); Anderson, 650 F. Supp. at 1486; DiMartino, 636 F. Supp. at 1248;
United States Steel Corp., 583 F. Supp. at 1360.
138. See Sullivan, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 202, at D-1; Cirillo, No. 87-4026
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file); United States Steel Corp., 583 F. Supp. at
1360.
139. See Lancaster, 809 F.2d at 541; Runyan v. National Cash Register Corp.,
787 F.2d 1039, 1044 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 178 (1986); Cirillo, No.
87-4026 (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file).
140. See Lancaster v. Buerkle Buick Honda, 809 F.2d 539, 541 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 3212 (1987); Runyan, 787 F.2d at 1044; Roper v. GTE Com-
munications Systems Corp., No. 84 C 10898 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 1986) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Courts file).
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educational background of the employee;14' and (6) the existence of
fraud or misrepresentation. 42
The factors used to evaluate the "knowing" prong in release cases
can help reduce the adequate disclosure problem of providing em-
ployees with accurate and comprehensible information about the
early retirement incentive.' 41 While the EEOC and the Henn court
recognized the necessity of employees receiving sufficient information
about the plan, both authorities failed to suggest a mechanism for
providing such information to the employees.'" Requiring the offer
to be written in plain english will assist the employees in under-
standing the terms of the plan. 41 Moreover, experience has shown
that an agreement is more likely to be adhered to when both parties
have participated in the negotiation process.'" As a final check, an
attorney can review the offer to ensure that it is fair, and that the
employees understand the terms of the offer. 47
b. Voluntary
To meet the "voluntary" requirement the release must not be the
result of coercion.' 4 Relevant to a determination of voluntariness
is whether the releasor has adequate time to make an educated
decision. 49 While the courts have not specified what is a reasonable
141. See Runyan, 787 F.2d at 1044; Cirillo v. Arco Chem. Co., No. 87-4026
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file).
142. See Silberman & Bolick, supra note 120, at 202; see also Coventry v. United
States Steel Corp., Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 169, at D-5 to -8 (Aug. 31, 1988)(court judges the validity of a waiver by employing a "totality of the circumstances"
test which takes into consideration the circumstances surrounding the particular
individual who has executed the release).
143. For a discussion of the adequate disclosure problem, see supra notes 111-
15 and accompanying text.
144. See Henn v. National Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d 824 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 454 (1987); EEOC Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 70.
145. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
146. See S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SA'DER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION 92 (1985).
147. See supra note 136. Although application of these factors may provide a
conduit to channel information about early retirement incentives to an employee,
they do not address the problem of how employers may objectively appraise an
employee of his future job prospects with a company.
148. See Note, Waivers Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Putting
the Fair Labor Standards Act Criteria to Rest, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 382, 406
(1987) [hereinafter Waivers].
149. See Cirillo v. Arco Chem. Co., No. 87-4026 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 1987)(LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file); Silberman & Bolick, supra note 120, at 202;
EEOC Notice of Final Rule, supra note 131, at 32,294.
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time period, 150 the factors articulated in Paolillo present a helpful
starting point when considering what is sufficient time. 5'
Evidence of duress is another indication that a release is invol-
untary.5 2 Invalidating a release on the grounds of duress protects
an employee from any contractual defects stemming from possible
overreaching or an unfair bargaining position on the part of the
employer.' 53
An employer may even consider including a "change of mind"
provision in the offer permitting the employee to rescind his ac-
ceptance after a specified time.'5 4 While this is no guarantee that
an employee's choice is voluntary, it provides an added safeguard
that can help protect against a coerced decision.
2. Application of the "Knowing and Voluntary" Standard to
Early Retirement Incentives
The "knowing and voluntary" test found in release cases should
supplant Paolillo and Henn as the proper standard for evaluating
the voluntariness of early retirement incentives. The criteria set forth
in Paolillo and Henn are too narrowly drawn to the particular facts
of each case, and therefore does not adequately serve as an ap-
propriate model on which to decide other cases.'55 The release cases,
however, are supported by a well-developed body of case law that
has established concrete and workable factors to determine whether
a release is "knowing and voluntary."' 6 The application of these
factors to ADEA claims of coerced retirement will import certainty
150. See, e.g., Cirillo, No. 87-4026 (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file).
151. The court in Paolillo considered the following factors when determining
whether the employees had sufficient time to make a voluntary decision: "(1) [t]he
shortness of time given to [the employees] to make a decision; (2) the reason for
the compressed time period; (3) the length of service of [the employees] with [their
employer]; and (4) the apparent complexity of the options open to [the employees]."
Paolillo v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 821 F.2d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 1987) (numbers added).
152. See Roper v. GTE Communications Systems Corp., No. 84 C 10898 (N.D.
I11. Aug. 8, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file); DiMartino v. City of
Hartford, 636 F. Supp. 1241, 1250 (D. Conn. 1986); Oglesby v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 620 F. Supp. 1336, 1343 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
153.'See Goff v. Kroger Co., 47 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 462, 465 (S.D.
Ohio 1988); Waivers, supra note 148, at 407-08.
154. See McLanahan, The Mechanics of Handling Employee Terminations:
Suggestions for Drafting Releases and Related Problems, 6 LEGAL NOTES & Vmw-
POINTS Q. 1, 6 (1986).
155. For a discussion of the criteria set forth in Paolillo and Henn to evaluate
the voluntariness of early retirement incentives, see supra notes 79-102 and accom-
panying text.
156. See supra notes 135-53 and accompanying text.
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and continuity into this area of the law. The courts will have a
definite set of guidelines to draw upon when analyzing the voluntary
nature of an early retirement plan, 5 7 and employers will be able to
incorporate these factors into their early retirement incentives to
minimize the risk of offering a coercive plan.
VI. Conclusion
Employers need clear legislative or judicial standards to follow
when drafting an open-window offer. If guidelines are not provided,
employers run the risk of a lawsuit every time they offer an early
retirement incentive. Likewise, employees must be protected against
forced retirement. Thus far the legislature has wholly neglected this
issue, and the few attempts by the courts to deal with the problem
have been inadequate. In light of the similarities between releases
and early retirement incentives, the "knowing and voluntary" stan-
dard used in release cases serves as an appropriate model to evaluate
the voluntariness of early retirement incentives.
Lisa E. Meyer
157. See id.
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